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Using Court-Annexed Arbitration to
Reduce Litigant Costs and to Increase




Court-annexed arbitration, one of the most popular alternative dis-
pute resolution innovations,' is being used to combat the two most
prevalent criticisms of the American civil justice system:2 delay and
high litigation costs. 3 Although arbitration programs are currently
operating in at least twenty states and ten United States federal dis-
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1. CPR LEGAL PROGRAM, ADR AND THE COURTS: A MANUAL FOR JUDGES AND
LAWYERS (1988).
2. For a critique of the problems with the civil justice system, see J. MARKS, E.
JOHNSON & P. SZANTON, DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN AMERICA: PROCESSES IN EVOLUTION
9-10 (1984); Planet, Reducing Case Delay and the Costs of Civil Litigation: The Ken-
tucky Economical Litigation Project, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 279 (1985); Yamamoto, Case
Management and the Hawaii Courts: The Evolving Role of the Managerial Judge in
Civil Litigation, 9 U. HAW. L. REV. 395, 396 (1987).
3. Barkai & Kassebaum, The Impact of Discovery Limitations on Cost, Satisfac-
tion, and Pace in Court-Annexed Arbitration, 11 U. HAW. L. REV. - (1989)
(forthcoming).
trict courts,4 they usually are characterized as "experimental" and
are under continuing evaluation.5
Hawaii first began experimenting with court-annexed arbitration
in 1986. After some program modifications, for the past two years it
has had a mandatory, nonbinding arbitration program for tort cases
valued up to $150,000. Like several other programs, it is proving that
arbitration can increase the pace of litigation.6 The Hawaii program
is unique, however, because unlike any other program, it is specifi-
cally designed to limit pretrial discovery. -Most importantly, this dis-
covery reduction is minimizing costs for litigants in Hawaii.
This article reports on an evaluation of Hawaii's Court-Annexed
Arbitration Program (CAAP). This program has national signifi-
cance for several reasons. First, the program, is unique because its
primary goal is cost reduction for litigants. Most other programs con-
sider cost reduction as a secondary goal;7 no other program has re-
ported success in this area. Cost reduction is achieved through
program features designed to reduce pretrial discovery. Second, the
program has a jurisdictional limit of $150,000 which is higher than
any other statewide program that offers full arbitration hearings.8
The success of CAAP signifies that an arbitration program need not
be limited to low value civil cases. Third, other features of the pro-
gram are unique and may be useful for other programs to consider.9
4. Conference of State Court Administrators, 1987 Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion Survey (July 17, 1987) [hereinafter COSCA Survey]; P. Ebener & D. Betancourt,
Court-Annexed Arbitration: The National Picture, 1985 RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST.;
Keilitz, Gallas, & Hanson, State Adoption of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 12 STATE
COURT J. 4, 6 (Spring 1988); Lind & Foster, Alternative Dispute Resolution in the Fed-
eral Courts: Public and Private Options, 33 FED. BAR NEWS & J. 127 (1986).
5. See Barkai & Kassebaum, supra note 3; Lind & Shapard, Evaluation of Court-
Annexed Arbitration In Three Federal District Courts, 1983 FED. JUD. CENTER 79;
Simoni, Wise, & Finigan, Litigant and Attorney Attitudes Toward Court-Annexed Ar-
bitration: An Empirical Study, 28 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 543 (1988).
6. Simoni, Wise, & Finigan, supra note 5, at 547.
7. The Hawaii program differs from other programs in that its-primary purpose
is to decrease litigant costs through a reduction in discovery activity. The program ac-
complishes this goal by not allowing any discovery unless it is authorized by the arbi-
trator. See HAW. ARS. R. 14(A). Other programs focus only on the reduction of delay.
Their arbitration rules discuss a time period at which discovery must be completed or
determine that cases go to arbitration after discovery has been completed. If these
programs hope to reduce costs, it will result from increasing the pace of litigation. Re-
cent research indicates, however, that case processing time is not correlated with costs.
See Trubek, Sarat, Lelstiner, Kritzer, & Grossman, The Costs of Ordinary Litigation,
31 UCLA L. REV. 72, 104 (1983).
8. Keilitz, Gallas, & Hanson, supra note 4, at 6.
9. The Hawaii program intervenes earlier in the case than other programs. Arbi-
trators are assigned after the answer is filed and before any discovery takes 'place. In
addition, the Hawaii program uses: (1) volunteer arbitrators; (2) a "gatekeeping" proce-
dure that presumes all cases to be eligible for arbitration (HAW. ARB. R. 8(A)); (3) a
procedure that allows attorneys to seek an exemption from the program when their
case may exceed the $150,000 ceiling (HAw. ARB. R. 8(A)); (4) a required pre-hearing
conference 30 days after an arbitrator has been assigned (HAW. ARB. R. 15(D)); and (5)
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Finally, because the program is using a randomized comparison group
in an extensive evaluation, the effects of arbitration can be isolated,
analyzed, and compared to regular litigation.
This article will first discuss the general problems of delay and
high litigation costs in America's courts. It then explains court-an-
nexed arbitration, particularly the Hawaiian program. The article
then presents and interprets data from the evaluation of the arbitra-
tion program. The evaluation shows that Hawaii's Court-Annexed
Arbitration Program increases the pace of litigation and reduces liti-
gation costs while maintaining adequate levels of satisfaction of the
participants.
II. PRETRIAL DELAY, LITIGATION COSTS, AND LAWYER'S FEES
A. The Pace of Civil Litigation
Despite the fact that rule 1 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
concludes with, "[These rules of civil procedure] shall be construed to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every ac-
tion," 10 virtually no one would seriously assert that America's civil
justice system is either speedy or inexpensive. Delay and high
costs, 1 ' often attributed to congested dockets and excessive discovery,
are considered to be major problems in American courts.12 Court-an-
nexed arbitration programs have been implemented to combat these
problems.
Delay is considered more serious13 and is most often criticized.14
an option for litigants to select and pay for their own arbitrator (HAW. ARB. R. 9(A)-
(B)).
10. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
11. Delay and high costs are usually discussed together:
Excessive cost and delay in the disposition of civil cases devalue judgments,
cause the memories of witnesses and parties to fade, cause litigants to accept
less than full value for their claims, prolong and exacerbate differences be-
tween people or entities, and make pursuing legal remedies prohibitively ex-
pensive for many people.
Attacking Litigation Costs and Delay, A.B.A. ACTION COMM'N TO REDUCE CT. COSTS
AND DELAY (Final Rep. 1984) [hereinafter A.B.A. ACTION COMM'N]. See Defeating De-
lay: Developing and Implementing a Court Delay Reduction Program, A.B.A. LAWS.'
CONF. TASK FORCE ON REDUCTION OF LITIGATION COST AND DELAY xiii (1986) [herein-
after A.B.A. TASK FORCE].
12. The problems are not limited to the United States. See Falt, Congestion and
Delay in Asia's Courts, 4 UCLA PAC. BASIN L.J. 90 (1985).
13. "Delay is the most significant single problem affecting the civil justice sys-
tem." A.B.A. TASK FORCE, supra, note 11, at 1.
14. Adler, Felstiner, Hensler, & Peterson, The Pace of Litigation, 1982 RAND INST.
FOR CIV. JUST. III [hereinafter Adler].
The number of lawsuits filed has increased dramatically in the past
few years,15 but the number of judges has not risen in proportion.16
State and federal legislatures also have created new causes of ac-
tion.17 Because case filings have increased even faster than the popu-
lation growth,' 8 some commentators have suggested that Americans
may be growing even more litigious.19
Although there is a clear consensus that delay exists, it is less clear
when, why, and where delay occurs. 20 Some courts measure delay
from the date of filing until the date the court can schedule a jury
trial.2 1 A closer look, however, reveals that scheduling trial dates is
not the true problem. The real problem is simply that cases are not
resolved soon enough. Because most cases never reach trial,22 theo-
retically the scheduled trial dates should not be very significant in
determining the pace of litigation. The focus on the trial date be-
comes important only because many cases do not get resolved until
shortly before trial.23 The pace of litigation may be the result of "lo-
cal legal culture."24
15. According to the former Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court,
"[t]he caseloads in both federal and state courts experienced a fantastic growth during
the past sixteen years." Burger, Introduction, Symposium: Reducing the Costs of Civil
Litigation, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 201, 210 (1985).
16. Former United States Supreme Court Chief Justice Warren E. Burger said:
In the federal system alone, for example, the number of new filings in District
Courts have nearly tripled from 112,606 when I took office in 1969 to 307,582
in 1985; the number of judges had increased only about 50%. In short, 300%
more cases are to be handled by 50% more judges.
A.B.A. TASK FORCE, sup'ra note 11, at vii.
17. S. -GOLDBERG, E. GREEN, & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 4 (1985); Yama-
moto, supra note 2, at 400-01.
18. See Hensler, Lipson, & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California, 1981 RAND
INST. FOR CIV. JUST. 1, 4-7; Hensler, Vaiana, Kakalik, & Peterson, Trends in Tort Liti-
gation, 1987 RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST. 2.
19. See, e.g., Barton, Behind the Legal Explosion, 27 STAN. L. REV. 567 (1975); Man-
ning, Hyperlexis: Our National Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REV. 767 (1977). For a contrary
view suggesting that hyperlexis is a myth, see Galanter, Reading the Landscape of Dis-
putes: What We Know and Don't Know (And Think We Know) About Our Allegedly
Contentious and Litigious Society, 30 UCLA L. REV. 4 (1983). For the best explana-
tion of these apparently contrary findings see Hensler, Trends in Tort Litigation:
Findings from the Institute for Civil Justice's Research, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 479, 492
(1987).
20. Hensler, supra note 19, at 492.
21. CHURCH, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL COURTS
9 (1978).
22. Of course, not all cases that do not go to trial aresettled. One of the few stud-
ies to examine case terminations found that only 63% of the cases filed terminated in
settlements. Thirty percent of the cases were terminated by means other than trial or
settlement. Kritzer, Adjudication to Settlement: Shading in the Gray, 70 JUDICATURE
161, 163 (1986).
23. G. WILLIAMS, LEGAL NEGOTIATION AND SETTLEMENT 78 n.23 (1983) (over 70%
of all cases settled within 30 days of the trial date).
24. Sipes, Managing to Reduce Delay, 1980 NAT'L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. 1 ("The
pace of litigation is more the result of 'local legal culture' rather than court structure,
procedures, caseload or backlog.").
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Because most cases terminate in a negotiated settlement without a
trial, apparently delay could be decreased if lawyers and clients set-
tled their cases earlier. It is not clear why cases do not settle earlier,
but several possibilities exist. Some delay is legitimately inherent in
the handling of a case. A certain amount of time is necessary to in-
vestigate a case, compile records, schedule discovery, or in some cases
wait for the plaintiff's injuries to stabilize. On the other hand, delay
may often result because lawyers are inefficient in managing their
workload or someone is trying to gain an economic advantage. Law-
yers may delay one case to work on another. Lawyers might not give
serious attention to a case until the approach of a "doomsday" event,
such as a scheduled deposition, a court hearing, a settlement confer-
ence, or even the trial.25 Some lawyers may want to keep a case open
because time spent working on a case produces income for the
hourly-fee lawyers. Defendants may have little interest in the timely
disposition of the case because they want to retain their money and
invest it as long as possible,26 or they may hope for the deterioration
of the evidence in the case against them.27 Finally, it is possible that
the adversary system may create so much animosity between the par-
ties that neither side is willing to extend a hand in compromise even
if it might lead to a settlement.
B. Excessive Litigation Costs
Although learning the facts of a case is essential, 28 pretrial discov-
ery can make a case very costly and may even deter ordinary people
from pressing their legal claims.29 Furthermore, more discovery may
be conducted than is necessary for a fair and efficient resolution of
the case. In fact, the word most often associated with discovery is
25. Lind & Shapard, supra note 5, at 79.
26. Adler, supra note 14, at vi; Alschuler, Mediation With a Two-Tier System In
Civil Cases, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1808, 1823 (1986). "[P]reserving the status quo favors the
defendant in almost every lawsuit." Professional Responsibility in Pretrial Discov-
ery-A Tale of Two Cities, 64 MICH. BAR J. 298, 300 (1985).
27. Church, Pretrial Delay: A Review and Bibliography, 1978 NAT'L CENTER FOR
ST. CTS. 13.
28. "Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essen-
tial to proper litigation." Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
29. The cost of discovery, however, should not deter either side from litigating a
tort lawsuit. Because plaintiffs' lawyers take personal injury cases on a contingent fee,
injured plaintiffs with a good case should always be able to find a lawyer. Defendants,
of course, will defend virtually all tort lawsuits because insurance companies are in-
volved in most of these suits. Insurance companies have the financial resources to liti-
gate in all appropriate cases.
"abuse."30 Although discovery procedures are, in theory, designed to
improve the exchange of information between the parties, discovery
is frequently put to a more adversarial use by delaying and making
the pursuit of a legal claim much more costly.3 1
Even though discovery is the target of criticism, it is actually law-
yer's fees that are the larger32 but less discussed aspect of costs.33 At
least for the hourly-fee lawyers, discovery activity generally means
an opportunity to bill more legal fees to the client.34 The combined
fees and expenses of plaintiff and defense lawyers in tort litigation
range from 45% to 63% of the total amount of cost and settlement
expended in litigation, including the amount received by the injured
30. A.B.A. LITIGATION SECTION, SECOND REPORT OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE FOR
THE STUDY OF DISCOVERY ABUSE, reprinted in 92 F.R.D. 137 (1980); C. ELLINGTON, A
STUDY OF SANCTIONS FOR DISCOVERY ABUSE 17 (1979); Becker, Modern Discovery:
Promoting Efficient Use and Preventing Abuse of Discovery in the Roscoe Pound Tra-
dition, 78 F.R.D. 267, 274-75 (1978); Brazil, Civil Discovery: Lawyers' Views of Its Ef-
fectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 789 (1980);
Brazil, Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the Sys-
tem of Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217, 230-35; District of Columbia
Survey: Hinkle v. Sam Blanken & Co.: Dismissal for Discovery Abuse-Toward a New
Standard in the District of Columbia, 36 CATH. U.L. REV. 761 (1987); Dombroff, Objec-
tive Procedures Could Curb Discovery Abuse, LEGAL TIMES, Sept. 6, 1982, at 15, col. 1,
at 32; Flegal, Discovery Abuse: Causes, Effects, and Reform, 3 REV. LITIGATION 1
(1982); Flegal & Umin, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation: We're Not There
Yet, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 597 (1981); Levine, "Abuse" of Discovery Abuse, N.Y.L.J.,
Aug. 16, 1982, at 1, col. 2; Lundquist & Flegal, Discovery Abuse-Some. New Views
About an Old Problem, 2 REV. LITIGATION 1 (1981); Pollack, Discovery-Its Abuse and
Correction, 80 F.R.D. 219 (1978); Rosenberg, Discovery Abuse, 7 LITIGATION 8, 9-10,
(Spring 1981); Rosenberg & King, Curbing Discovery Abuse in Civil Litigation:
Enough is Enough, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 579; Sherwood, Curbing Discovery Abuse:
Sanctions Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the California Code of Civil
Procedure, 21 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567 (1981); Sofaer, Sanctioning Attorneys for Util-
ity of Punishment, 57 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 680 (1983); Tell, Legal Fee Axed for Litton
Case Discovery Abuse, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 12, 1981, at 2, col. 4; Comment, Preventing
Abuse of Discovery in Federal Courts, 30 CATH. U.L. REV. 273, 284-305 (1981); Note,
Discovery Abuse Under the Federal Rules: Causes and Cures, 92 YALE L.J. 352 (1982);
Note, The Emerging Deterrence Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978); Note, Rule 37 Sanctions: Deterrents to Discovery Abuses,
46 MONT. L. REV. 95 (1985).
31. See Brazil, The Adversary Character of Civil Discovery: A Critique and Pro-
posals for Change, 31 VAND. L. REV. 1295 (1978); Shapiro, Some Problems of Discovery
in an Adversary System, 63 MINN. L. REV. 1055 (1979).
32. A.B.A. ACTION COMM'N, supra note 11, at 60.
33. Lawyers' fees are part of litigation "transactions costs" which are "the sum of
plaintiffs' costs, defense costs, and public costs. They are the 'overhead' costs of the
system in the sense that the services purchased are not desired for themselves." S.
Carroll & N. Pace, Assessing the Effects of Tort Reforms, 1987 RAND INST. FOR CIV.
JUST. 22.
34. "Discovery is good for our business but has nothing to do with justice." Brazil,
Views from the Front Lines: Observations by Chicago Lawyers About the System of
Civil Discovery, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 217 (1980); Brazil, Civil Discovery: Law-
yers' Views of Its Effectiveness, Its Principal Problems and Abuses, 1980 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 787 (1980).
[Vol. 16: S43, 1989] Using Court-Annexed Arbitration
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
plaintiffs.3 5 After deducting lawyer's fees, discovery, and other costs
of litigation, plaintiffs receive only about fifty percent of the money
paid out in trial verdicts or money paid to settle claims in regular tort
cases.
36
The relationship of discovery to lawyer fees differs for plaintiff and
defense lawyers because of how fees are calculated. Plaintiffs' law-
yers in tort litigation are paid on a contingent' fee basis; defense law-
yers, on the other hand, are usually paid on an hourly basis3 7 by
insurance companies. A large part of the defense lawyer's bill is for
time spent conducting discovery. It is quite'easy to see that a reduc-
tion in discovery will reduce the defense costs. Of course, any pro-
gram that reduces the amount of discovery will have a corresponding
effect of reducing the income of these hourly-fee lawyers. From a
personal economic perspective, defense lawyers may be likely to re-
sist an innovative arbitration program that limits pretrial discovery.38
The arbitration program's impact on fees for the plaintiffs' lawyers
is quite different. Plaintiffs' lawyers on a contingent fee receive
nothing unless the plaintiff recovers. Typically, plaintiffs' lawyers
take a 33-1/3% to 40% contingent fee," although the rates vary depend-
ing on the jurisdiction, the type of case, and the personal reputation
of the lawyer.39 Because plaintiffs' lawyers are not paid on an hourly
basis, a reduction in'discovery will not automatically diminish- the
35. In auto torts, the defense legal fees are 19%, plaintiff legal fees are 26%, and
the net compensation to the plaintiff is 52%.. In non-auto torts, the defense legal fees
are 30%, plaintiff legal fees are 24%, and the net compensation to the plaintiff is 43%.
In asbestos cases, the defense legal fees are 37%, plaintiff legal fees are 26%, and the
net compensation to the plaintiff is only 37%. Hensler, Vaiana, Kakalik, & Peterson,
Trends in Tort Litigation, 1987 RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST. 29.
36. Plaintiffs in automobile accident cases net about 52% of the total expenditures.
In non-auto torts they only receive about 37% of the transaction costs. Hensler, supra
note 19, at 492-94.
37. In arbitration cases, some lawyers are being paid to handle the case on a flat
fee basis through the arbitration hearing. If there is an appeal of the arbitration
award, a new fee arrangement will begin as the case heads towards trial de novo.
38. Insurance companies are aware that discovery reductions, which save expenses
for the company, will reduce defense fees. In Hawaii, these companies are trying to
avoid problems with their defense lawyers by promising that every time that a defense
lawyer settles a case in arbitration, another new case will be given to the defense law-
yer to replace the one that has settled.
39. In Hawaii, the fee is generally 33-1/3% in automobile accident tort cases, and
40% for all other torts. At the time of recovery, the lawyer receives the agreed upon
percentage of the recovery. The costs of discovery are deducted from the plaintiff's
share of the recovery, and the plaintiff's lawyer is reimbursed for the advance of the
discovery costs. Finally, the plaintiff receives the net sum remaining. If there is a de-
fense verdict at trial, the plaintiff still owes the plaintiff's lawyer for the costs of dis-
covery; but in actuality, plaintiffs seldom pay back those advanced discovery costs, and
lawyers' fees.40 In fact, in studies of fee structures, programs that
saved plaintiffs' 'lawyers time did not result in a fee reduction for the
client.41 Hence, it is possible that a reform that reduces discovery
will neither significantly taper the total costs for the plaintiff nor
lessen the income of plaintiffs' lawyers. In the Hawaii arbitration
program, the plaintiffs' lawyers may actually make the same amount
of money in fees from a case in less time than in regular litigation.42
The contingent fee system is a major subject of controversy, 43 espe-
cially during discussions of "tort reform." Whether the contingent
fee is "the poor man's key to the courthouse" 44 or simply an opportu-
nity for "greedy attorneys . . . [to] generate suits that would not
otherwise be brought"45 remains a controversial question. In striking
a balance between these two views, some jurisdictions have begun to
place a limitation on the amount of fees that a plaintiff's lawyer can
receive in medical malpractice cases. 46
plaintiffs' lawyers seldom pursue their claim against the plaintiff for the advanced dis-
covery costs. Interview with a plaintiff's lawyer, Apr. 20, 1988.
40. Hensler, Lipson, & Rolph, Judicial Arbitration in California: The First Year,
1981 RAND INST. FOR CIV. JUST. 82; Note, Compulsory Automobile Arbitration: New
Jersey's Road to Reducing Court Congestion, Delay, and Costs, 37 RUTGERS L. REV. 401,
430-31 (1985).
41. In contingent fee cases, with procedures that save attorney time, "lawyers are
benefiting, but clients are not." A.B.A. ACTION COMM'N, supra note 11, at 66; Chapper
& Hanson, The Attorney Time Savings/Litigant Cost-Savings Hypothesis: Does Time
Equal Money?, 8 JUST. SYs. J. 258 (1983).
42. This fee analysis assumes that arbitration will not affect the value of cases set-
tled in the program.
43. In concluding, we emphasize again our firm conviction that to the maxi-
mum degree possible litigants themselves should be the beneficiaries of reduc-
tions in the cost of litigation. At the same time, we are acutely aware that
overall costs to litigants are in the main a reflection of how attorney's fees are
structured in the United States and the various methods of calculating such
fees. Whether those fees are fair to counsel and client and whether they can
or should be changed substantially in amount or method of calculation pose
fundamental issues of fairness and political feasibility that our mission and
our resources could not encompass. We feel strongly, however, that the or-
ganized bar, at both the national and state levels, has an inescapable and im-
mediate duty to address this overriding issue of how attorneys' fees affect
litigant cost and access to justice.
A.B.A. ACTION COMM'N, supra note 11, at 67. See Clermont & Currivan, Improving on
the Contingent Fee, 63 CORNELL L. REV. 529 (1978); Kriendler, The Contingent Fee:
Whose Interests are Actually Being Served?, 14 FORUM 406 (1979).
44. Young, Medical Malpractice in Florida: Prescription for Change, 10 FLA. ST.
U.L. REV. 593, 609 (1983) (citing FLORIDA ACADEMY OF TRIAL LAWYERS, SELF-PRESER-
VATION OF A PRIVILEGED CLASS 11 (1982)).
45. Comment, Recent Medical Malpractice Legislation-A First Checkup, 50 TUL.
L. REV. 655, 670 (1976).
46. A.B.A. ACTION COMM'N, supra note 11; Klein, Caps in the Hat: Legislative
Lids on Runaway Verdicts, 28 FOR THE DEFENSE 19, 22 (July 1986).
Section 6146 of California's Medical Injury Compensation Reform Act of 1975
(MICRA) limits contingency fees in actions against a health care provider based upon
alleged professional negligence to: (1) 40% of the first $50,000 recovered; (2) 33-1/3%
of the next $50,000; (3) 25% of the next $100,000; and (4) 10% of any amount on which
the plaintiff's recovery exceeds $200,000. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6146 (West Supp.
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III. HAWAII'S COURT-ANNEXED ARBITRATION PROGRAM
A. Program Goals and History
Hawaii's Court-Annexed Arbitration Program (CAAP) is intended
to "provide a simplified procedure for obtaining a prompt and equita-
ble resolution of certain civil matters."47 It is generally agreed that
the major goals of the program are: (1) to reduce litigant costs; (2) to
increase the pace of disposing of tort cases; and (3) to improve or at
least maintain the level of satisfaction for litigants and attorneys. 48
Although the statute establishing the arbitration program is specifi-
cally limited to tort cases, 49 the court rules provide that other civil
cases may be submitted to the program if the parties agree.50
CAAP has operated in two different forms. When the program
first began in 1986, it was designed under the Hawaii Supreme
Court's rulemaking power as a two-year experiment and was author-
ized by the Circuit Court Rules for the First Circuit.51 Initially, the
program was voluntary. Any party could request that a tort case val-
ued at or below a "probable jury award of $50,000" be placed into the
arbitration program.52 This first $50,000 program is now referred to
as Phase I.
The arbitration program was changed less than six months later
into the Phase I experimental program. During a special legislative
session on the "Tort Reform,"53 the Hawaii Legislature passed Act 2
of 1986 which included an expanded arbitration program as part of
the legislation.54 The most significant program change required by
this new law was a major increase in the jurisdictional ceiling to
1989); see DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 6865 (medical malpractice); TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-
26-120 (medical malpractice). See also Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, Inc., 37 Cal. 3d 920,
695 P.2d 164, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 990 (1985) (upholding the
limit on contingent fees paid to plaintiff's lawyer).
47. HAW. ARB. R. 2(a).
48. Letter from Janice Wolf, Administrative Director of the Courts and Peter S.
Adler, Director, Program on ADR, to the President and Members of the Senate, and
the Speaker and Members of the House of Representative of the Thirteenth State Leg-
islature of the State of Hawaii (Dec. 30, 1986) (available in the office of The Study of
Arbitration and Litigation).
49. HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-20 (1986).
50. Admission to the program also requires the consent of the Arbitration Judge.
HAW. ARB. R. 6(B). To date, no non-tort cases have been accepted to the program.
51. HAw. CIR. CT. R. 34.
52. Id.
53. For a list of state tort reform laws passed in 1986, see S. Carroll & N. Pace,
supra note 33, at 47-72.
54. HAW. REV. STAT. § 601-20 (1986).
$150,000. Beginning on May 1, 1987, all tort cases with "a probable
jury award value, not reduced by the issue of liability, exclusive of
interest and costs, of $150,000 or less" were included in the pro-
gram.55 With a $150,000 ceiling, CAAP has the highest jurisdictional
amount of any mandatory, full arbitration program in a state court.56
Even in the Phase I ($50,000) program, Hawaii's jurisdictional
amount was as high as any state full arbitration program in the coun-
try,5 7 and now it is three times higher. Only a few federal courts
have jurisdictional amounts as high as Hawaii's.58
B. Changes in Phase II of the Program
The Judicial Arbitration Commission,59 a group empowered to
oversee the arbitration rules, made several additional rule and proce-
dural changes in order to accommodate the new jurisdictional
amount. In the new Phase II program, a significant change occurred
in the gatekeeping function. In Phase I, all tort cases valued at
$50,000 or less were supposed to enter the program. Cases, however,
entered the program only if the plaintiff requested or the defendant
demanded arbitration. In essence, cases were invited into the pro-
gram; it was voluntary. As might be expected, many cases did not
enter the program for reasons of ignorance, caution, suspicion, or
strategy.60 In Phase II, the gatekeeping function was changed so that
all tort cases automatically enter the program once filed in court.
Lawyers who think their cases exceed the jurisdictional limit must
request exemption from the program.
55. Id.
56. Michigan has a mandatory program which has no jurisdictional limit. How-
ever, this program does not contemplate full arbitration hearings with testimony
presented by witnesses. Each case is allocated approximately 30 minutes before a
panel of three mediators (a plaintiffs' lawyer, a defense lawyer, and a neutral lawyer)
who make an arbitration award. The award is more of a case evaluation based upon
the short presentation by the opposing lawyers and answers to questions posed by the
panel rather than an adjudicative result after hearing witnesses. Although it is called
the Michigan "Mediation" Program, the panel of lawyers perform the service of arbi-
trators who propose a non-binding result, and not the service of mediators who assist
the parties to reach their own decision. Interview with Robert K. Schweikart, Media-
tion. Tribunal Clerk, Mediation Tribunal Association for the Third Judicial Circuit
Court of Michigan, in Detroit, Michigan (Jan. 1987). See Shuart, Smith, & Planet, Set-
tling Cases in Detroit" An Examination of Wayne County's "Mediation" Program, 8
JUST. Sys. J. 307 (1983).
57. Keilitz, Gallas, & Hanson, supra note 4, at 4.
58. P. Ebener & D. Betancourt, supra note 4. In a newly initiated round of federal
court experimentation with court-annexed arbitration, the jurisdictional ceilings will
be limited to $100,000, but the jurisdictions that are using a $150,000 limit will be al-
lowed to retain that ceiling. Court Reform and Access to Justice Act of 1988, 28 U.S.C.
§ 651(c) (Supp. V 1987).
59. The Commission is a body of representatives of plaintiff and defense lawyers
as well as one representative from the insurance industry.
60. Lawyer interviews on file in the office of The Study of Arbitration and Litiga-
tion, Department of Sociology, University of Hawaii at Manoa. See also infra note 82.
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To better control the flow of cases through the Court-Annexed Ar-
bitration Program, Phase II rules require that arbitrators schedule a
prehearing conference within thirty days of the date a case is as-
signed.61 In addition, the arbitrator -selection process has been
changed. Under Phase I rules, initially one arbitrator was assigned to
a case; if either party objected to the arbitrator, a list of five potential
arbitrators was circulated to the parties and each party was allowed
to strike two names.62 Under Phase II rules, five potential arbitra-
tors are initially proposed, with each party receiving two peremptory
strikes.6 3 Lastly, during the summer of 1987, CAAP was extended to
all circuit courts giving Hawaii a statewide arbitration program. 64
C. A Description of Hawaii's Arbitration Program
Hawaii's Court-Annexed Arbitration Program is a mandatory, non-
binding arbitration procedure for tort cases with a probable jury
award of less than $150,000. For purposes of this program, all tort
cases are presumed to be valued at $150,000 or less.6 5 In other words,
all tort cases are initially assigned to the arbitration program; attor-
neys then must request that their case be exempted from the pro-
gram if they believe the value of the case exceeds $150,000.66
After the last defendant's answer is filed, a volunteer arbitrator 67
61. HAW. ARB. R. 15(D).
62. HAW. ARB. R. 9 (repealed 1987).
63. HAW. ARB. R. 9.
64. Expansion to the neighboring islands offers new challenges to the program-
most notably, ensuring a sufficient supply of lawyer arbitrators on each of the neigh-
bor islands. Twenty-three percent of Hawaii's population lives on the neighboring is-
lands of Maui, Kauai, and Hawaii (generally referred to as the "Big Island"), but only
six percent of the state's lawyers live on those islands. 25 HAW. BAR NEWs 20 (July
1988). Furthermore, although the distances are not great between the islands, only air
travel is available. Finally, a balance between plaintiff and defense lawyers in the ar-
bitrator pool is more problematic on these neighbor islands. The Judicial Arbitration
Commission recognizes that most potential arbitrators on the neighboring islands are
plaintiff attorneys.
65. Under the Phase II program, all cases are presumed to be qualified for the
program. HAW. ARB. R. 8(A). Under the earlier Phase I program, either the plaintiff
or the defendant could request arbitration for cases valued at $50,000 or less. HAW.
ARB. R. 8 (repealed 1987).
66. HAW. ARB. R. 8(A). The arbitration administrator also automatically exempts
wrongful death cases.
67. Over 400 lawyers now serve the program as volunteer arbitrators. After a
brief group orientation, the new volunteers are added to the pool of arbitrators. Arbi-
trators are selected from members of the bar who have at least five years of experi-
ence in civil litigation (most of them practice tort litigation). Currently, all arbitrators
are lawyers, although nonlawyers who have the equivalent qualifying experience "can
be arbitrators." HAW. ARB. R. 10(B).
is assigned to the case. The arbitrator must schedule a prehearing
conference within thirty days from the date a case is assigned68 and
determine what pretrial discovery will be allowed. Discovery is per-
mitted only with the consent of the arbitrator.6 9 The arbitrator can
attempt to aid in the settlement of the case if all parties consent in
writing.70 If the case proceeds to an arbitration hearing, attorneys
must file a prehearing statement 7 ' thirty days prior to the hearing.72
At the arbitration hearing, the rules of evidence can be relaxed7 3
and no transcription or recording is permitted.74 Arbitration awards
must be in writing although findings of fact and conclusions of law
are not required. 75 Awards are not limited to the jurisdictional
amount of $150,000. Awards must be filed within seven days of the
conclusion of the arbitration hearing or within thirty days after the
receipt of the final authorized memoranda of counsel.7 6
The award becomes the final judgment if no party files a written
Notice of Appeal and Request for Trial de Novo within twenty days
after the award is served upon the parties.77 If such Notice and Re-
quest are timely filed, the case is scheduled for a trial de novo. The
case is then administered as if it had never been in arbitration. Com-
plete discovery is permitted under the rules of civil procedure. How-
ever, no testimony elicited during the course of the arbitration
hearing is admissible at the trial de novo. 78 There are disincentives
attached to the appeal process in the form of sanctions for failure to
prevail in the trial de novo. When parties appeal, they must be
awarded an amount at least fifteen percent greater at the trial de
novo than the arbitration award79 or be subject to sanctions of attor-
ney fees up to $5000, costs of jurors, and other reasonable costs actu-
ally incurred.8 0
IV. THE EVALUATION PROJECT
Researchers from the University of Hawaii are evaluating the arbi-
68. HAW. ARB. R. 15(D).
69. HAW. ARB. R. 14.
70. HAW. ARB. R. 11(A)(10).
71. The arbitration rules dictate the contents of the prehearing statement which
includes material similar to what would be submitted in a pretrial settlement confer-
ence with a judge. HAW. ARB. R. 16.
72. HAW. ARB. R. 16.
73. HAW. ARB. R. 11(A)(2).
74. HAW. ARB. R. 17(B).
75. HAW. ARB. R. 19.
76. HAW. ARB. R. 20(A).
77. HAW. ARB. R. 21.
78. HAW. ARB. R. 23(C).
79. HAW. ARB. R. 25.
80. HAW. ARB. R. 26.
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tration program in the First Circuit CourtSl of Hawaii through an
evaluation project called The Study of Arbitration and Litigation
(SAL).82 Approximately 1000 tort cases per year are eligible for the
program in this circuit. The evaluation is being conducted in a ran-
domized83 experimental design with two groups of cases. One-half of
the cases are assigned to the arbitration program and one-half of the
cases are designated as a "comparison group" and are assigned to
traditional courtroom litigation.84 Initially, all tort cases are pre-
sumed to be eligible for arbitration and are assigned to the arbitra-
tion program when they are filed in the clerk's office. Eligible cases
are then assigned either to arbitration or to regular litigation by ran-
dom numbers.
A comparison group of cases is necessary to measure the effects of
arbitration against cases in regular litigation. A comparison group is
also necessary to develop an adequate database on cases in regular lit-
igation. Current court records are only partially useful in this regard
because they are geared to tracking cases, but are not very helpful
for evaluating the arbitration program.
Since the program began in 1986, more than 1500 cases have en-
tered CAAP. The majority of cases settle in CAAP and do not result
in an arbitration hearing. The ratio of settlements to awards is about
three to one. Just over 50% of the awards are appealed, but so far
virtually all of the appeals have resulted in settlements on appeal.
81. The evaluation effort is limited to the First Circuit because Phase I of the pro-
gram was implemented only in this circuit. Furthermore, the majority of the tort
cases in the state are filed in this circuit.
82. The Study of Arbitration and Litigation (SAL) is located in the Department of
Sociology at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. This project is being funded by a
three-year contract from the judiciary, a grant from the Program for Conflict Resolu-
tion at the University of Hawaii, and in-kind contributions from the Sociology Depart-
ment and the William S. Richardson School of Law, all of the University of Hawaii at
Manoa.
83. The randomized experiment has been referred to as "the most powerful of re-
search designs." Lind & Foster, supra note 4, at 128. For more about random samples,
see D. VINSON & P. ANTHONY, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH METHODS FOR LITIGATION
142-44 (1985).
84. This proportion of regular litigation cases to arbitration cases has changed be-
cause of program needs. Formerly, one-third of the cases were randomly assigned to
the comparison group. Originally, one-third was decided upon as the random compari-
son sample by the Arbitration Commission, the Arbitration Administrator, and the
evaluation team. It was later increased to one-half at the behest of CAAP to decrease
the number of arbitrators needed. Some plaintiff lawyers whose cases fell randomly in
the comparison sample have complained that they want their comparison case placed
into the arbitration program. These comments suggest that the arbitration program is
satisfactory to plaintiff lawyers.
Only one case out of over 750 which terminated after entering CAAP
has resulted in a trial.
In the evaluation effort, more than 600 CAAP and comparison
cases have been surveyed, and more than 1000 surveys have been
completed and returned by lawyers. Although the comparison group
will figure heavily in the evaluation, they are not discussed in this ar-
ticle because very few have closed so far.8 Furthermore, the com-
parison cases that have closed appear to be early settlements (85%
settled before an answer was filed by the defendant), and therefore
are probably not representative of the usual cases in typical litigation.
Data collected for the evaluation are drawn from five sources: (1)
a case record database maintained by the arbitration administrator;
(2) surveys of lawyers and arbitrators conducted after a case closes by
settlement, award, or dismissal, sampling cases in arbitration8 6 and in
the comparison group; (3) surveys of lawyers conducted after an arbi-
tration appeal is concluded; (4) a general survey of the lawyers most
active in CAAP;87 and (5) interviews and focus group sessions with
lawyers,88 arbitrators, insurance industry representatives and others
involved in tort litigation.
The focus of the evaluation is on cost, pace, and satisfaction be-
cause these factors reflect the goals of CAAP. "Cost" includes dis-
covery costs, time spent on cases by plaintiffs' lawyers, and hourly
fees of defense lawyers. "Pace" measures the time necessary to ter-
minate a case once it enters the arbitration program. "Satisfaction" is
measured by questions asking lawyers how satisfied they were with
the program and how satisfied they thought their clients were. The
essence of the program evaluation is to determine if disposing of a
case in the arbitration program can decrease cost and increase pace,
while maintaining satisfaction.
Aside from whether or not the case was in CAAP, several major
factors are expected to influence cost, pace, and satisfaction. The
maximum dollar exposure, case complexity, experience of and confi-
dence in the arbitrator, and whether the case proceeded to an award
or was settled, may be significant factors. On an even more basic
level, lawyers may have different views of arbitration because they
see arbitration as impacting plaintiff and defense lawyers differently,
85. The fact that not many comparative cases but a large proportion of arbitration
cases have closed suggests that arbitration has increased the pace of litigation relative
to regular litigation.
86. The survey response rate has been 76% for arbitrators, 73% for plaintiff law-
yers, and 59% for defense lawyers.
87. This was a one time survey sent to the 91 lawyers who had the most cases in
CAAP. These lawyers were involved in 84% of all cases we surveyed, indicating that a
limited number of specialists handle a large percentage of the cases. Sixty-two lawyers
returned this survey.
88. We met separately with plaintiffs' lawyers and with defense lawyers.
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especially in the area of lawyer's fees. Because the arbitration pro-
gram seeks to reduce discovery, the effect of arbitration on contin-
gent fee plaintiffs' lawyers, who. do not obtain payment for the time
they expend on discovery, may be different from the effect on the
hourly-fee defense lawyers who may 'derive a large proportion of
their fees from conducting discovery.
The evaluation attempts to answer the following questions:
1) Do arbitrators and lawyers comply with the basic concept of
limiting discovery?
2) Is CAAP reducing litigant costs?
3) Are any cost savings being passed on to litigants?
4) Is CAAP increasing the pace of litigation?
5) Are cases closed within prescribed time limits?
6) Are participants satisfied with arbitration?
7) Is there an adequate supply of arbitrators?
8) Are arbitrators sufficiently experienced and impartial?
V. EVALUATION RESULTS
A. Reducing Discovery
Although more than thirty court-annexed arbitration programs op-
erate across the country,89 only Hawaii's program has significant pro-
gram features designed to reduce discovery, and .thereby reduce
litigant costs. Most other arbitration programs begin after discovery
is completed. At most, they limit the time for discovery, but not the
amount.
. The majority of lawyers and arbitrators who were surveyed re-
ported that in CAAP discovery was voluntarily reduced. The reduc-
tion did not effect the outcome of the case. In cases that settled, 73%
of plaintiffs' lawyers, 64% of defense lawyers, and 84% of arbitrators
thought discovery was reduced.90 In cases resulting in awards, 83%
of plaintiffs' lawyers, 70% of defense lawyers, and 93% of arbitrators
thought discovery was reduced.
Discovery can be reduced either because the arbitrator denies re-
quests for discovery under the arbitration rules or because lawyers
89. See supra note 4.
90. The estimates made by the plaintiffs' lawyers, defense lawyers, and arbitrators
that the arbitration program resulted in reduced discovery are reported below. Esti-
mates are reported separately for cases that settled and cases that went to awards.
voluntarily agree to limit discovery.91 Discovery reduction appears to
be derived mainly from lawyers voluntarily reducing discovery. For
cases that settled, 86% of the plaintiffs' lawyers, 67% of the defense
lawyers, and 85% of the arbitrators thought that discovery was volun-
tarily reduced. For cases that had an award, the estimate of volun-
tary reduction was very similar; 83% of the plaintiffs' lawyers, 71% of
the defense lawyers, and 83% of the arbitrators thought that discov-
ery was voluntarily reduced.92 Denials of discovery requests by the
arbitrator seemed to be infrequent, taking place in approximately
20% of the cases. 93
One concern about the goal of discovery reduction is' whether such
a policy affects the outcome of the case. A significant percentage of
lawyers hold that discovery reduction did affect or may have affected
the outcome of their case. The percentage of lawyers reporting that
it did affect the outcome is small, but a higher percentage of attor-
neys in every category thought that it may have affected the out-
come. For settlements, 15% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 37% of defense
lawyers thought that discovery reduction did or may have affected
Table 1: Estimates of Discovery Reduction
Plaintiff Defendant Arbitrator
Settled Award Settled Award Settled Award
DISCOVERY
Reduced 73% 83% 64% 70% 84% 93%
Same 27 17 36 30 16 7
n= 67 51 53 56 56 94
91. Voluntary reduction of discovery does not mean that the lawyers cannot ob-
tain the information that is normally garnered in pretrial discovery. In CAAP, infor-
mal and less expensive methods of discovery are encouraged. For example, documents
may be exchanged between the parties rather than being subpoenaed. Informal inter-
views are encouraged instead of oral depositions. Conference telephone calls to the
treating physician can be made rather than a long, costly deposition.
92. Table 2: How Discovery Was Reduced
Plaintiff Defendant Arbitrator
Settled Award Settled Award Settled Award
VOLUNTARILY
REDUCED DISCOVERY
Yes 86% 83% 67% 71% 85% 83%
No 14 17 33 29 15 17
n= 42 46 51 46 47 84
93. Table 3: Denial of Discovery
Plaintiff Defendant Arbitrator
Settled Award Settled Award Settled Award
ARBITRATOR
DENIED DISCOVERY
Yes 5% 22% 26% 23% 21% 32%
No 95 78 74 77 79 68
n= 42 46 39 52 62 93
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the outcome. 94 Lawyers whose cases resulted in awards often
thought that discovery reduction did or may have affected the out-
come of the case. For awards, 50% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 47% of
defense lawyers held such a belief. Nonetheless, considering the
levels of satisfaction with the program reported in other parts of the
survey, it appears that even with this concern about affecting out-
come, the program is satisfactory to the majority of lawyers.
B. Using Discovery Reduction to Reduce Litigation Expenses
Discovery reduction is important because a decrease in discovery
will lower discovery costs, which are a part of litigant costs. With the
high percentage of lawyers reporting a reduction of discovery, it
should not be surprising that the majority of lawyers report that dis-
covery costs are lower in CAAP. Plaintiffs' lawyers more often see
CAAP as saving costs than do defense lawyers. For awards, which
are generally more costly than settlements, 67% of plaintiffs' lawyers
and 52% of defense lawyers reported that discovery costs would have
been higher if the case had not been in arbitration. 95 The one excep-
tion to the general opinion that discovery costs are lower in arbitra-
tion is that a majority of defense lawyers report that discovery costs
for settlements are about the same in CAAP and regular litigation.
Only.28% of defense lawyers who settled, but 56% of plaintiffs' law-
yers thought CAAP was cheaper than regular litigation.
In the general survey, of the sixty-two lawyers with the most cases
in CAAP, 83% reported that CAAP was cheaper than regular litiga-
94. Table 4: Effect of Discovery Denial
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
DISCOVERY DENIAL
AFFECTED OUTCOME
Yes 2% 7% 15% 17%
Maybe 13 33 23 30
No 85 60 63 53
n= 46 43 40 53
95. Table 5: Discovery Costs of CAAP
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
COSTS IF NOT
IN ARBITRATION
Greater 56% 67% 28% 52%
Same 41 24 62 31
Lower 3 7 9 17
n= 73 46 53 52
tion; 17% thought the cost was about the same. Not a single plaintiff
or defense lawyer thought that CAAP was more expensive than reg-
ular litigation.
At this time we cannot verify the extent to which the program is
actually reducing costs, and we cannot even confirm that such reduc-
tion is occurring. Answers will not be available until more compari-
son cases close. We do, however, have data on what the discovery
costs have been for cases in CAAP.
The reported discovery costs for award cases underestimates the fi-
nal discovery cost because more discovery is likely to be conducted if
the case is appealed. The data shows that discovery is more expen-
sive in cases that go to awards than in cases that settle, and that out-
of-pocket discovery for the plaintiff and defendant is roughly compa-
rable. For settlements, plaintiffs averaged $322 in discovery costs and
defendants averaged $479; for awards, plaintiffs averaged $980 and
defendants averaged $865.96 Discovery costs for the majority of law-
yers surveyed were below $400 and approximately 90% of settlement
discovery costs were below $1000.97 Slightly more than one-third of
the awards had discovery costs in excess of $1000.
Of course, discovery costs are just part of total litigant costs. For
the majority of cases we surveyed, both plaintiff and defense discov-
ery costs represented only ten percent or less of the total. The larg-
est part of litigant costs is lawyer's fees, not the discovery costs. We
estimated the fees for plaintiffs' lawyers by computing one-third of
the settlement or award value, which is the standard contingent fee
percentage in Hawaii. In the cases where we had the settlement or
award amount, the lawyer's fees for plaintiffs' lawyers averaged
$10,946 for settlements (n=82) and $9186 for awards (n=51). The av-
erage fee computed for awards includes defense awards for zero dam-
ages.98 The plaintiff's lawyer would not earn a fee in such cases.
For defense lawyers, the average fee was $2928 for settlements
96. Table 6: Discovery Costs Reported
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
AVERAGE DISCOVERY COST $322 $980 $479 $865
n= 68 46 45 42
97. Table 7: Range of Discovery Costs
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
DISCOVERY COST
$0-399 75% 37% 60% 50%
400-999 16 24 27 7
1000 + 9 39 13 43
n= 68 46 42 45
98. Twenty-two percent of the awards were defense awards, and we did not calcu-
late a contingent fee for these cases.
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(n=45) and $5955 for awards (n=42). The fees for defense lawyers
were taken from the figures reported by the defense lawyers on the
surveys. However, if the award is appealed, both plaintiffs' lawyers
and defense lawyers will continue to work on the case. The fee for
the plaintiffs' lawyers will not change even though these lawyers
work more hours on the case because they are working on a contin-
gent fee basis. The lawyer's fees for plaintiffs are more likely to de-
crease because cases that settle on appeal often settle for somewhat
less than the award.99 On the other hand, defense lawyers will con-
tinue to earn more fees when the case is appealed because these law-
yers are working on an hourly fee. We cannot estimate the defense
lawyers' fees on appeal until more appealed cases close and can be
surveyed.
For defendants, a reduction of discovery costs is likely to reduce
lawyer's fees because defense lawyers generally charge an hourly
rate. If less discovery is allowed, presumably the defense lawyers
will bill fewer hours on each case. If discovery is being reduced by
CAAP, defense lawyers are probably making less money on each case
they handle in CAAP. One effect of CAAP, however, is that some
insurance companies in Hawaii now pay defense lawyers a flat fee for
handling cases through the arbitration hearing.
For plaintiffs, a reduction of discovery costs will not effect the law-
yer's fees. Plaintiffs' lawyers work on contingent fee, typically re-
ceiving one-third of the total settlement as the fee. After the
plaintiff's lawyer's fee is deducted, the discovery costs and any other
litigation expenses are subtracted and the plaintiff receives the re-
maining amount. Put simply, the plaintiff's attorney's fee is purely a
function of the size of the settlement. If CAAP reduces not only the
number of calendar days that a case remains open but also reduces
the amount of time a lawyer needs to spend preparing the case, plain-
tiffs' lawyers could be making more money per hour with CAAP.
Additionally, because plaintiffs' lawyers often advance the discovery
costs, CAAP will also benefit plaintiffs' lawyers because they will
now advance costs for a shorter period of time.100 Furthermore, ear-
lier payment by the defendants to the plaintiffs will mean that plain-
99. Of the first 29 cases that settled on appeal after an award, 18 cases, or 62%
settled at a value of less than the award.
100. Costs of discovery and other litigation costs are often advanced by the plaintiff
lawyers. When the case terminates in a settlement or trial verdict, the plaintiff law-
yers deduct one-third of the amount as a fee and then deduct the litigation costs which
have been advanced. The plaintiff receives the amount remaining.
tiffs will have the use of their money sooner, which is an economic
benefit.
C Potential Savings in Litigation Costs
Although information from lawyer surveys indicates that the ma-
jority of lawyers think that CAAP is cheaper than regular litigation,
we cannot directly estimate how much it is saving. We can, however,
provide a rough guide as to the potential savings. The first step is to
estimate the number of cases that could be in CAAP. If the compari-
son group continues, approximately 1000 cases would enter the pro-
gram each year; without a comparison group, approximately 1500
cases would enter the program each year.101 Although purely hypo-
thetical, we can project the potential costs savings produced by
CAAP at various levels of reduction of litigation costs. For every
$100 that CAAP could reduce litigation costs, total litigation expenses
annually in the state could be reduced by $100,000 if the comparison
group remains in place' 02 and by $150,000 if all eligible tort cases are
in the program. Total cost savings should be some multiple of
$150,000.
D. Pace of Termination
The majority of lawyers report that CAAP is reducing the time it
takes to terminate their case. This conclusion is especially true for
cases in which an award was rendered.'0 3 For awards, 76% of plain-
tiffs' lawyers and 77% of defense lawyers thought that it would have
taken longer to close their case if it had not been in arbitration.
Sixty percent of plaintiffs' lawyers whose cases terminated by settle-
101. In each of the fiscal years 1985-1986 and 1986-1987, there were approximately
1250 tort cases filed in the First Circuit. One-half of the cases are being placed in the
comparison group and are not in CAAP. Approximately 500 tort cases are filed annu-
ally in all of the other circuits combined. Assuming that 10% of the cases in CAAP are
exempted because they are estimated as being over the $150,000 limit state-wide, ap-
proximately 1012 cases would be eligible for CAAP each year (625 cases from the First
Circuit, plus 500 from the other circuits, minus 10% for exempted cases). If no com-
parison group existed, approximately 1575 cases would be eligible for the program each
year (1750 cases from the First Circuit plus 500 from the other circuits, minus 10% for
exempted cases).
102. This analysis assumes that 1012 cases average a $100 reduction. The $101,200
potential savings is rounded to $100,000.
103. Table 8: Estimates of Time Savings
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
TIME IF NOT IN CAAP
Later 60% 76% 28% 77%
Same 39 14 67 17
Sooner 1 10 5 6
n= 72 50 57 53
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ment also thought CAAP was more expedient. Defense lawyers,
however, had a different opinion about settlement cases. Only 28%
of defense lawyers thought settlements were more expeditious in
CAAP.104 The majority of defense settlements thought the pace in
CAAP was about the same as the pace in regular litigation.
In the general survey, the lawyers reported that most cases in
CAAP were completed faster than cases in regular litigation. Ninety-
two percent of all lawyers thought CAAP was faster than regular lit-
igation and 83% thought it was cheaper. Eight percent thought cases
took about the same amount of time. Not a single plaintiffs' lawyer
or defense lawyer thought CAAP was slower than regular litigation.
CAAP rules require that cases be completed within nine months
(270 days) from the service of the complaint.105 We use the term
"pace" to refer to the time required to close a case, 106 although there
can be several measures of pace.107 The average pace is within the
nine-month deadline for settlements (223 days from the answer) and
just over nine months for awards (283 days from the answer).108 All
indications are that the pace of cases in regular litigation is much
slower. One method of evaluating pace is to look at the cases sched-
uled for settlement conferences.109 Numerous sources have indicated
that cases in regular litigation go to settlement conferences eighteen
to twenty months after filing.110 Only 7% of settlements and 19% of
104. One possible explanation has been learned in focus group interviews and other
conversations with defense lawyers. Because formal discovery must be approved by
the arbitrator, and because it takes 67 days on the average to assign an arbitrator to a
case, some defense lawyers have complained that plaintiffs' lawyers will not provide
even informal discovery until an arbitrator is appointed. In regular litigation, as soon
as an answer is filed, the defense lawyer can subpoena the plaintiff's medical records
and send interrogatories to the plaintiff.
105. HAW. ARB. R. 15(A).
106. Our data on pace is from case records of the first 567 cases that have closed in
CAAP.
107. Pace can be measured from the date of filing the complaint, from the date the
complaint is served, from the date the answer is filed, or from the date the arbitrator
is assigned.
108. This data on pace excludes both dismissals and cases that terminated before
the defendant answered, which are approximately one-third of all cases closed in
CAAP. If the excluded case were included in the data, CAAP would appear to be even
faster.
109. Under local procedure, settlement conferences are scheduled the month before
a case is scheduled for trial.
110. This estimate was given by several judges and court clerks, but it is not one of
the statistics the court compiles as a matter of course. Our evaluation team will be
compiling the information by examining the monthly reports from the judges who are
assigned to conduct settlement conferences. See HAW. CIR. CT. R. 12.1 (1984) (civil set-
tlement conference).
awards in CAAP exceed one year from the defendant's answer.'1 1
While the overall program has a substantial number of cases that
extend beyond the nine-month deadline, the arbitrators are able to
terminate cases within nine months of their assignment. Once an ar-
bitrator is assigned, the average settlement closes in 167 days and the
average award closes in 197 days. A significant proportion of cases
are closed much earlier: 61% of the settlements and 38% of the
awards occur within six months or less.112 It is the delay in assigning
arbitrators to cases that accounts for almost ninety percent of the de-
lays exceeding nine months. The average time to assign an arbitrator
from the case entering CAAP was 117 days, and 67 days from the de-
fendant's answer. The program administration reports that the delay
occurs when all arbitrators are assigned to pending cases. Because
the program assigns an arbitrator to only one case at a time, the pro-
gram must wait for cases to close until five arbitrators are available
to form a panel for each new case.
E. Satisfaction with CAAP
Although some evaluations focus their satisfaction inquiry on the
litigants, we have chosen to focus on the lawyers at this time. We
have not attempted to contact the individual litigants who have had
cases in CAAP to ask them about their satisfaction with the program.
The reasons for this choice are both theoretical and practical. First,
we assume that lawyer satisfaction is a critical measure for the pro-
gram. If the lawyers are dissatisfied with the program, they will re-
sist this innovation and render it ineffective. Second, there are great
practical difficulties with contacting litigants. Their addresses are
not listed in the court record and our only access to them would be
through their attorneys. Additionally, in most cases individual liti-
111. Table 9: Pace of Case Closings
SETTLEMENT AWARD
TIME FROM DEFENDANT'S ANSWER UNTIL CLOSING
< 270 days 71% 52%
271-365 22 29
> 365 7 19
n 186 117
112. Table 9: Pace-Arbitrator Assignment until Closing
SETTLEMENT AWARD
TIME FROM'ARBITRATOR ASSIGNMENT UNTIL CLOSING






[Vol. 16: S43, 1989] Using Court-Annexed Arbitration
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
gants-especially injured plaintiffs-would not have had prior expe-
rience with other tort litigation. Even if they did have prior tort
litigation experience, it is most likely that their other tort experience
Would not be contemporaneous with the present CAAP and, there-
fore, they could not compare CAAP to regular litigation.
Our goal is to compare randomly assigned CAAP and regular liti-
gation cases. For all of the above reasons, we have asked the lawyers,
virtually all of whom have had cases in both CAAP and in regular
litigation, to indicate their level of satisfaction with the program. To
obtain a measure of client satisfaction, however, we also asked law-
yers to indicate what they think the level of satisfaction was for their
clients.
The majority of lawyers reported being satisfied with the way their
case was handled in CAAP when they were surveyed about a specific
case.113 Perhaps not surprisingly, attorneys are less satisfied with
awards than with their voluntary settlements. Interestingly, defense
lawyers were more critical and dissatisfied than were plaintiffs' law-
yers.114 Ninety-six percent of the plaintiffs' lawyers and 75% of de-
fense lawyers were satisfied with their settlements; 75% of plaintiffs'
lawyers and 63% of defense lawyers were satisfied with the program
when an award was rendered in their case.
In the general survey, 78% of all lawyers reported that they were
satisfied with the program, and 29% were dissatisfied. Again, a major
difference in satisfaction was found between plaintiffs' lawyers and
defense lawyers. Ninety-one percent of the plaintiffs' lawyers were
satisfied with the program, but only 46% of the defense lawyers were
satisfied.
1. Defense Satisfaction
In both the case-specific and the general surveys, the defense law-
yers are less satisfied with the arbitration program than are plain-
113. Table 10: Lawyer Satisfaction
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
SATISFIED 96% 75% 75% 63%
DISSATISFIED 4 26 25 37
n= 52 47 40 51
114. At least one other arbitration evaluation has found that plaintiffs' lawyers are
more satisfied with arbitration that are defense lawyers. Maccoun, Lind, Hensler, Bry-
ant, & Ebener, Alternative Adjudication: An Evaluation Of The New Jersey Automo-
bile Arbitration Program, 1988 RAND INST. FOR Civ. JUST. 70.
tiffs' lawyers. Even though the majority of the most active plaintiff
and defense lawyers who have responded to the general survey agree
that CAAP is both faster and cheaper than regular litigation, a con-
siderable percentage of defense lawyers express dissatisfaction with
the program.
The source of the defense dissatisfaction is not clear, but at least
two hypotheses can be derived from the data. First, if CAAP truly is
reducing discovery and therefore discovery costs, hourly-fee defense
lawyers may realize decreasing income from working fewer hours on
each case. Furthermore, court records do not indicate that tort fil-
ings have increased.115 The bottom line on costs is that not a single
plaintiff or defense lawyer reported that CAAP was more expensive
than regular litigation.
Second, even if economic considerations are not the prime source
of dissatisfaction, the manner in which cases are terminated within
CAAP could result in dissatisfaction for defense lawyers. For exam-
ple, lack of sufficient discovery might cause defense lawyers to feel
obligated to settle cases and conduct the arbitration hearings "in the
dark." Such a process might be less professionally satisfying for
these lawyers.
Another possible explanation for defense dissatisfaction is that de-
fense lawyers might believe that insurance companies are now set-
tling cases at an inflated value and that justice is no longer being
done. In the general survey, lawyers were asked their opinions as to
what effect the arbitration program has had on the settlement value
of tort cases eligible for the program. Thirty-three percent of law-
yers believed that the settlement value has remained the same; 35%
thought the impact was unclear; 7% thought the value decreased; and
25% thought the value increased. Again, the major differences are
between plaintiff and defense lawyers. Only 14% (three of twenty-
two) of plaintiffs' lawyers, but 42% (eight of nineteen) defense law-
yers, thought values had increased. Hence, dissatisfaction by the de-
fense lawyers is correlated to the opinion that the value of cases has
increased.
F. Arbitrator Workload and Compensation
Practicing lawyers who serve as arbitrators are the backbone of the
program. Without the hours of work provided by the lawyers, the
program could not function. Arbitrators are central to the Hawaiian
115. When CAAP began, one opinion was that plaintiffs' lawyers would file more
cases because CAAP offered a low-cost opportunity to test cases with questionable lia-
bility. While a lawyer might decline to take a plaintiff's case because questionable lia-
bility meant that the lawyer would be advancing a considerable amount of time and
money in discovery activity, CAAP allows a quick low-cost case evaluation.
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program because the arbitrator is appointed so early in the life of the
case.' 16 No deposition or other formal discovery can be undertaken
without the approval of the arbitrator.11
Just how much and what kind of work do the arbitrators perform
in an arbitration case? Although most arbitration programs use the
arbitrators only to hold hearings and issue awards, Hawaii arbitrators
are appointed at the beginning of the case and manage it until termi-
nation. The Hawaii procedure means that arbitrators are involved in
cases that settle. Arbitrators averaged less than five hours of work
on settlements and about fifteen hours on awards.11
The amount of time that arbitrators spend on a case varies widely.
Half of the settlements are achieved in three hours or less, but ten
percent take from nine to thirty hours.1 9 Similarly, twenty percent
of the awards take eight hours or less and seventeen percent of the
awards take from twenty-one to fifty hours. This data suggests either
that cases vary considerably in the problems they present, or that ar-
bitrators vary considerably in their style and skill at managing the
case, or perhaps both.
Arbitration hearings are the largest single block of time spent by
the arbitrators and serve as a "day-in-court" for the parties. The law-
yers reported that the majority of the arbitration hearings took less
than four hours to complete.120 However, thirty percent of the hear-
116. HAW. ARB. R. 9.
117. HAW. ARB. R. 14(A).
118. Table 11: Arbitrators Work Hours
Settlement Award
AVERAGE HouRs OF WORK By ARBITRA-
TOR 4.5 14.9
n= 63 94
119. Table 12: Arbitrator Workload
Settlement Award
HouRs PER CASE BY PERCENTAGE OF
CASES












ings took five to eight hours and seven percent took longer than nine
hours.
The arbitrator is allowed to engage in the settlement process with
the signed consent of all parties.12 1 However, less than half of the ar-
bitrators report being formally involved in settlement efforts. This is
a proportion that seems to be declining.122 Of course, even if the ar-
bitrators engage in settlement discussions it does not mean that they
were successful in facilitating settlement.123
We have determined from interviews and focus groups that some
lawyers are not willing to allow the arbitrator to engage in settle-
ment discussions because if a mediated settlement fails, then the ar-
bitrator might be improperly influenced by information acquired
during the settlement discussions. Some lawyers believe that arbitra-
tors would simply "split-the-difference"124 between the plaintiff's de-
mand and the defense's offer. We have only recently included a
"split-the-difference" question in the arbitration surveys. Although
not many cases have been surveyed on this issue, we can report that
only a small percentage of lawyers thought that the arbitrator had
"split-the-difference"'in their case.
Data from CAAP records indicate that the average case is valued
at about $30,000 even in an arbitration program that takes all cases
121. HAW. ARB. R. 11(A)(10).
122. Table 14: Arbitrator Settlement Activity
PHASE I PHASE II
Settlement Award Settlement Award
ARBITRATOR ENGAGED IN
SETTLEMENT
YES 71% 51% 41% 50%
No 29 49 59 50
n= 49 51 64 94
The percentage of cases in which arbitrators engaged in settlement has decreased in
Phase II as compared to Phase I. One explanation for the change is that lawyers, and
particularly insurance companies, are more concerned with the "split-the-difference"
problem. For a definition of "split-the-difference," see infra note 124.
123. Obviously, all settlement attempts failed in those cases that eventually re-
sulted in an award. Furthermore, as indicated in the table below, even when the arbi-
trator engaged in settlement discussions, the arbitrator often did not think she actually
assisted in the settlement.
Table 15: Settlement Activities
PHASE I PHASE II
Settlements Settlements
ASSISTED IN SETTLEMENT 55% 25%
124. "Splitting-the-difference" is a common negotiating technique. See H. EDWARD
& J. WHITE, THE LAWYER AS A NEGOTIATOR 121 (1976). In a two-party negotiation,
the best prediction of the final settlement is the midpoint between the offers of both
parties. H. RAIFFA, THE ART & SCIENCE OF NEGOTIATION 48 (1982).
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valued up to $150,000.125 Because most arbitration programs are lim-
ited to small cases or, at most, cases valued at less than $50,000,126 the
following information is very interesting about the setting of jurisdic-
tional limits of a program. In Hawaii's program, which has a jurisdic-
tional limit of $150,000, almost 90% of the cases have settlements or
awards of $50,000 or less.127
G. Complexity
Most arbitration programs are limited to lower valued and presum-
ably simpler cases. When the jurisdictional limit was raised to
$150,000 in Hawaii, many people speculated that higher valued cases
would be more complex and inappropriate for an arbitration pro-
gram. Very few cases in Hawaii's $150,000 program, however, were
considered by the lawyers to be complex.12 8 This finding runs
counter to the hypothesis that arbitration is appropriate only for sim-
ple, lower valued cases.
H. Hearings
Accelerated pace and cost containment in CAAP do not prevent
litigants from having their "day-in-court." Plaintiffs were able to tell
their stories to a neutral fact-finder by testifying in virtually all
(96%) of the arbitration hearings. Defendants also had an opportu-
nity to personally respond. Their testimony was heard in 68% of
125. Table 16: Average Settlement or Award
SETrLEMENT AWARD
PHASE II $28,191 $31,426
In Phase I of the program, which took only cases valued up to $50,000, the average
case terminated at about $21,000 ($20,880 average for settlements and $21,244 average
for awards).
126. Keilitz, Gallas, & Hanson, supra note 4, at 6.
127. Table 17: Amount of Settlement or Award
AMOUNT OF SETLEMENT OR AWARD Percentage Within Range
$0 - $50,000 89%
$50,001 - $75,000 6
$75,001 - $100,000 3
.$100,001 + 2
128. Table 18: Case Complexity
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
Not Complex 40% 40% 50% 47%
Average 53 44 42 47
Complex 7 16 8 5
n= 55 50 60 57
those cases. Even though the plaintiff testified at almost every hear-
ing, expert testimony was heard in only one-third (36%) of the cases.
Low levels of expert testimony at the hearings may represent an im-
portant cost saving for CAAP as well as resulting in less inconven-
ience for doctors and other professionals.
L Arbitrator Fairness
In any arbitration program, it is essential that the arbitrator be
perceived as competent, fair, and impartial. When arbitrators hear
cases and issue awards, they are acting like a judge. Arbitrators need
to be seen as neutral third-parties if the participants are to have con-
fidence in the program. The necessity for the perception of fairness
may be even more important in Hawaii's program than in other arbi-
tration programs because the CAAP arbitrators not only hold arbi-
tration hearings, but control the case from the beginning because
they must approve any pretrial discovery.129
The perception of fairness might be even more problematic be-
cause the arbitrators have law practices that concentrate almost ex-
clusively on either representing plaintiffs or representing defendants
in tort cases, and they are asked to serve as third-party neutrals for
only a few hours each year. For our purposes, arbitrators whose own
law practice concentrates on representing plaintiffs are called a
"plaintiff's" arbitrator, and of course, defense lawyers are called "de-
fense" arbitrators.13 0 The concern is that plaintiff's arbitrators might
give a better, and presumably higher, award to the plaintiffs and that
defense arbitrators might be better for the defense. This assumption
of arbitrator bias can be seen in the arbitrator selection process.
When an arbitrator panel of five names is presented to the lawyers in
each case, perhaps not suprisingly, plaintiffs' lawyers mainly strike
defense lawyers and defense lawyers mainly strike plaintiffs' law-
yers. The assumption is that plaintiffs' lawyers would favor plaintiffs
and defense lawyers would favor defendants.
129. HAW. ARB. R. 14(A).
130. This labeling of the third-party neutral can also be seen in criminal courts.
When a judge has formerly been a prosecuting attorney, that judge is often considered
a "prosecution oriented" judge. Discretionary rulings of the judge, particularly on such
matters as search and seizure motions to suppress evidence or sentencing, are often
decided in a pattern that appears to favor the prosecution. In other words, when the
judge has the ability to exercise discretion in decisionmaking, those decisions often re-
flect the partisan views developed through years of partisan law practice. "Defense
oriented" judges refers to lawyers whose experience before becoming a judge was that
of representing criminal defendants.
A similar bias could be expected from arbitrators who are full-time partisan advo-
cates, and who are only in the role of a third-party neutral a few hours per year. Arbi-
trators will have to make decisions in which their practice bias could effect their
decision when they apportion negligence between the parties and when they deter-
mine damages.
[Vol. 16: S43, 1989] Using Court-Annexed Arbitration
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
Despite informal comments from lawyers that some of the lawyers
on the arbitrator list might not be qualified to handle cases or might
be biased toward one side, the survey evidence is overwhelmingly the
opposite. Lawyers reported that the arbitrator in their case was ex-
perienced and impartial. In cases that settled, 97% of plaintiffs' law-
yers and 88% of defense lawyers thought the arbitrator was
experienced enough to handle the case.13 ' In cases that actually re-
quired an arbitrator's decision in the form of an award, 83% of plain-
tiffs' lawyers and 89% of defense lawyers thought the arbitrator was
sufficiently experienced. The ratings for impartiality were even
higher than for experience.13 2 In settlements, 98% of plaintiffs' law-
yers and 97% of defense lawyers rated the arbitrators as impartial; in
awards, 89% of plaintiffs' lawyers and 90% of defense lawyers rated
the arbitrators as impartial.
This disparity between the general lore of partiality and assess-
ments of impartiality on specific cases may result from the CAAP
procedure that allows each side to exclude the two most unacceptable
arbitrators on the panel. 133 While some arbitrators on the panel may
be considered unqualified by some lawyers, the lawyers are usually
able to exclude such arbitrators from their case with their peremp-
tory challenges.
An examination of the zero dollar or defense awards also suggests
that bias does not exist. The defense awards have been almost identi-
cal for plaintiff's arbitrators and defense arbitrators. In fact, on the
basis of defense awards, a defense lawyer has a marginally better
chance of getting a defense award from a plaintiff's arbitrator. Plain-
tiff's arbitrators made thirteen defense awards out of fifty awards
131. Table 18: Rating Arbitrators' Experience
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
ARBITRATOR EXPERIENCE
Not enough 3% 17% 13% 11%
Yes, enough 97 83 88 89
n= 36 42 32 44
132. Table 19: Ratings of Arbitrator Partiality
Plaintiff Defense
Settlement Award Settlement Award
Impartial 98% 89% 97% 90%
Partial, but No Effect 2 - - 6
Partial, and Effect - 11 3 4
n= 41 46 32 49
133. HAW. ARB. R. 9.
rendered; defense arbitrators made eleven defense awards out of
fifty-four awards. Furthermore, the average dollar amount of awards
also suggests either no bias or at most a slight reverse bias. The aver-
age awards were lower for plaintiff's arbitrators ($31,769) than for
defense arbitrators ($32,735). Our conclusion is that there is no indi-
cation that arbitrators are biased in favor of the side they normally
practice.
J. Compensation of Arbitrators
The issue of arbitrator compensation is complicated. Arbitrators
are performing a service and could reasonably expect.to be compen-
sated for their efforts. Paying arbitrators for the market value of
their time would likely drive up the costs of the program to the point
that there would be no cost savings from arbitration.134
CAAP currently operates through the volunteer efforts of several
hundred lawyers who serve as arbitrators. This "pro bono" aspect of
court-annexed arbitration is rare. Although no arbitration program
in the country pays the arbitrators at a rate matching the income of a
lawyer in private practice, most programs do at least offer an honora-
rium or stipend. Some people have suggested that CAAP should
compensate arbitrators in some way to attract and retain arbitrators.
In fact, our general survey indicated that one-third of the lawyers re-
sponding thought paying arbitrators would improve the" program.
This was the most common suggestion.
We do not take a position on this policy issue of arbitrator compen-
sation but offer several considerations. First, if CAAP actually
reduces the costs and increases the pace of litigation, then clear eco-
nomic benefits accrue to the defendant, the plaintiff, and the plain-
tiffs' lawyers. Therefore, there is an argument for compensating the
lawyers whose time is used to produce these savings. None of the
people or groups who appear to benefit economically from CAAP are
typically considered to be indigent, and therefore, none of them
would be candidates for pro bono legal services.
Economic benefits may accrue to the person or corporation (typi-
cally an insurance company) who pays the defense costs, and who
might save costs under CAAP; to the plaintiff who might receive
both a larger share of the settlement if litigation costs are reduced
and who might receive the settlement earlier; and to the plaintiffs'
lawyers who might save the time value of money by advancing the
costs of litigation for a shorter period of time. With reduced discov-
ery, defense lawyers and private court reporters who record deposi-
tions might be making less money on tort cases with CAAP. If these
134. The Michigan Mediation Tribunal may be the only program in the country
that compensates lawyers at the market value of their time.
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people are not making less money, then CAAP is probably not saving
any costs.
Second, an honorarium or other reward may be necessary to at-
tract, motivate, and retain arbitrators. Although lawyers might be
willing to temporarily volunteer their time, some lawyers might stop
arbitrating unless they derive some personal or professional
benefit.135
If, under any theory, the argument for compensation is persuasive,
a strong note of caution is advised. Until data from the comparison
cases can be collected and analyzed, it cannot be determined how
much money, if any, is being saved by using CAAP. Even if the
CAAP savings is large enough to be significant, the savings could be
offset by the payment of a stipend to the arbitrators.
In addition to the economic argument against paying arbitrators,
there are other arguments as well. CAAP might be a means of en-
couraging "pro bono" activity by lawyers whose practice expertise
would not otherwise lend itself to traditional forms of "pro bono" ac-
tivity. Furthermore, the amount of time that a lawyer is likely to
spend as an arbitrator each year is small. Many arbitrators might
even be willing to contribute more time to the program voluntarily.
K Program Capacity
The long-term capacity of the Hawaii arbitration program is a sig-
nificant concern. Currently, the program is assigning one-half of the
eligible cases to a control group for evaluation purposes. Under the
present program, policies, and conditions, CAAP is strained to handle
all the cases assigned to arbitration within the nine month deadline.
If the control group were eliminated, the current supply of arbitra-
tors would be inadequate to handle all the cases eligible for arbitra-
tion. The Judicial Arbitration Commission, a group charged with the
responsibility to "develop, monitor, maintain, supervise and evaluate
the [p]rogram"136 is considering -program changes to remedy this
problem.
135. In a novel proposal to both provide an honorarium and improve the program, a
budget request is being sent to the Hawaii Legislature to provide funds to pay the arbi-
trators a $100 honorarium to attend a one-day arbitrator training program. Discussions
with Peter Adler, Executive Director of the Program on Alternative Dispute Resolu-
tion for the Hawaii Judiciary (Feb. 1989).
136. HAW. ARB. R. 4(A).
VI. CONCLUSION
Hawaii's Court-Annexed Arbitration Program appears to be meet-
ing its goals of reducing litigant costs, increasing pace, and maintain-
ing the satisfaction of participants. CAAP is delivering arbitration
largely within the time frame prescribed by its rules and, in doing so,
to the satisfaction of the majority of lawyers. It clearly has succeeded
in reducing pretrial discovery, and no other program can make that
claim. After more comparison cases have closed, a later report will
be able to provide data comparing pace, cost, and satisfaction in
CAAP with regular litigation. To our knowledge, no other arbitra-
tion program in the country claims to be reducing litigation costs; Ha-
waii leads the nation in this area.
